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INTRODUCTION
Although the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 19401 (the
“Advisers Act”) was not at the center of the post-financial crisis
regulatory reform that culminated in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (“Dodd-Frank” or
“Dodd-Frank Act”), it was certainly part of the reform effort. In
particular, Dodd-Frank amended the Advisers Act—the federal
statute that regulates investment advisers and their activities—
in a manner intended to address the ways in which privatelyoffered funds, particularly hedge funds, may have exacerbated
the financial crisis. The primary regulatory concern, whether
valid or not, was that, given the magnitude of assets invested in
hedge funds and hedge funds’ penchant for pursuing certain
types of risky investment activities, such as taking positions in
credit default swaps, those funds potentially helped create
systemic risk.3 Arguably, Dodd-Frank was about nothing if not
mitigating systemic risk.
And so lawmakers set about to bolster “hedge fund
regulation.” They did so, ultimately, by effectively stapling
various hedge fund-related provisions to the Advisers Act,
notwithstanding that that statute theretofore contained nary a
mention of hedge funds. In broad strokes, as a result of DoddFrank’s amendments and the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (the “SEC”) rulemaking under Dodd-Frank,
investment advisers who manage hedge funds are required to
†

Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012).
2
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
3
See Edmund L. Andrews & Louise Story, Geithner To Outline Major Overhaul
of Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/
business/economy/26regulate.html?dbk.
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become registered with, and regulated by, either the SEC or the
relevant state regulatory authorities.4 That result is, in large
part, a product of Dodd-Frank’s elimination of an exemption from
SEC registration on which, prior to Dodd-Frank, many advisers
to hedge funds had relied.5 In addition, most advisers managing
enough assets to be required to register with the SEC are now
required to submit to the SEC periodic reports containing a wide
range of information about the funds they manage, including
those funds’ investment activities and portfolio holdings.6 The
SEC, furthermore, is authorized to share that information with
the newly-created Financial Services Oversight Council.7
Now, in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank’s enactment and the
SEC’s associated bout of rulemaking, one might think that the
Advisers Act’s regulatory regime is a workable and effective one,
equipped to address—and address efficiently—the investorprotection risks that the twenty-first-century investment adviser
industry produces. In fact, however, Dodd-Frank did not touch—
and, indeed, Dodd-Frank’s crafters indicated no awareness of—
many of the Advisers Act’s longstanding troubles. Additionally,
the changes Dodd-Frank brought about have their own
considerable deficiencies. As this Article contends, the U.S.
investment adviser regulatory regime, now seventy-four years
old, is in need of more than a few statutory amendments and new
SEC rules. For the sake of the investor-protection goals of
securities regulation, the promotion of market integrity, and
regulatory efficiency, U.S. investment adviser regulation needs to
be rethought and reformed. Focusing both on longstanding and
new regulatory weaknesses, this Article highlights five grounds
for that conclusion.

4

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(29), -3(b), -3a(a); 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203A-1, -5 (2013).
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
6
See id. § 80b-4; 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1(a).
7
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b). In addition, those larger advisers, by AUM, who
manage only hedge funds and therefore may rely on an exemption from SEC
registration—until those funds’ collective assets reach $150 million—must
nonetheless report certain types of information with the SEC and comply with
certain other requirements under the Advisers Act. See id. § 80b-3(m);
17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4.
5
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REGULATION EXEMPTIONS

The shortcomings of the U.S. investment adviser regulatory
regime begin with the rules dictating who must become
registered as an investment adviser and who may avail
themselves of an exemption from registration—and, therefore,
regulation by the SEC. Prior to the regulatory changes that the
Dodd-Frank Act effected, things were rather simple in that
regard. In particular, an investment adviser that had in excess
of twenty-five million dollars under management and at least
fifteen “clients” had to become registered.8 Those advisers that
managed the threshold amount of assets but that had fewer than
fifteen clients were generally exempt from SEC registration.9
Advisers who had assets under management (“AUM”) below
twenty-five million dollars were generally prohibited from
becoming registered with the SEC, based on Congress’s judgment
that such smaller advisers reasonably fell within state, rather
than federal, regulatory jurisdiction.10
The rationale for the client-based exemption was that an
adviser that provides its investment advice only to a very small
number of clients creates no particular threat to the regulatory
goal of ensuring the integrity of the securities markets and
arguably creates only a de minimis concern for the goal of
protecting investors. As many readers might recall—and as Part
II elaborates further—the fewer-than-fifteen-client exemption
came to create fairly substantial regulatory concerns once hedge
funds and other private funds came to dominate investment
advisory services.11 That complication aside, and as discussed
below, an exemption based on client count generally seemed to be
a reasonable one. However, the long and rocky reform process
that led to the Dodd-Frank Act would not countenance the client8
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i) (removed 2011). Even if an adviser met
those requirements, it was nonetheless required to become SEC-registered if it
satisfied certain other conditions, such as if it managed a mutual fund or other
registered investment company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(B).
9
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(B).
10
See id. § 80b-3a(a). Any such smaller adviser may or may not have had to
register with the relevant states, depending on the particular states’ regulatory
regimes.
11
That concern is evidenced by the so-called “hedge fund registration rule” that
the SEC adopted in 2004, see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge
Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,05758, 72,070 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 275, 279), which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated in 2006, see Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 88081 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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based exemption’s survival.12 Eliminating the exemption, of
course, was only one of the myriad changes that Dodd-Frank and
the associated SEC rules made to the Advisers Act’s regulatory
scope.13
The Dodd-Frank amendments, at their core, were designed
to more effectively regulate investment advisers to private
funds—hedge funds, in particular—and the particular risks to
systemic stability that hedge funds were seen to be creating.
Toward that end, the amendments expressly acknowledge that
some advisers may manage hedge funds, while others do not, and
tailor the Advisers Act’s newly reformulated registration
exemption accordingly. Post-Dodd-Frank, an adviser managing
between $25 million and $100 million in assets may not register
with the SEC unless the adviser would not otherwise be subject
to regulation by a state authority.14 Investment advisers with
less than $25 million in AUM generally may not register with the
SEC, regardless of what the relevant state requirements might
be.
One hundred million dollars, then, is the new asset-based
threshold for SEC registration. However, pursuant to a rule that
the SEC adopted under Dodd-Frank, an adviser that manages
only private funds need not become registered with the SEC if its
AUM is below $150 million—again, as long as the adviser is
otherwise subject to regulation by the relevant state or states.15
So, for example, an adviser that manages one hedge fund with
three investors and, separately, the assets held by three
individuals in three separate brokerage accounts is subject to the
$100 million threshold. However, if those individuals instead
placed their account assets in the hedge fund, the $150 million
threshold would apply. The amendments and new rules contain

12
See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Dodd Frank’s Long-Distance Paper Chase, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1d6d6808-009a-11e1-ba3300144feabdc0.html#axzz2QSwtPBey (discussing the “sheer complexity and opacity
of the reform process”).
13
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 401–419, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–80 (2010).
14
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(29), -3(b), -3a(a); 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203A-1, -5 (2013).
15
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1); 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203(m)-1. However, as noted,
these advisers are still required to report information to the SEC regarding the
funds they manage. See supra note 7.
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substantially greater complexity than this brief description
suggests, but these are the important components for present
purposes.
If the objectives of investment adviser regulation remain
primarily to protect investors and promote market integrity,
while encouraging innovation and a robust securities market,
then the new exemption regime seems ill-suited to further
regulatory objectives. Arguably, there continues to be a de
minimis level of investment advisory activity, regardless of the
amount of assets involved, that does not call for regulatory
oversight in the form of investment adviser registration and
regulation. However, as the description above suggests, the
Dodd-Frank amendments fail to make such a distinction—nor do
they even try—save to specify that advisers managing only
private funds may remain unregistered until they reach the $150
million AUM threshold. Rather, all investment advisers with
greater than $100 million—or $150 million, as the case may be—
under management must become registered and be substantively
regulated, even if they have only a very small number of clients.
That approach may constitute excessive regulation, causing
inefficient and poor use of regulatory resources, and, moreover, is
inconsistent with the approach the SEC has pursued under the
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”)16 and its exemption
from registration for securities offerings that are “non-public.”17
Under one of the safe harbors set forth in Regulation D under the
Securities Act, for example, a securities offering remains exempt
from SEC registration if all but thirty-five of the offerees meet
certain financial qualification thresholds, provided the issuer
complies with a few other requirements.18
A better approach for amending the Advisers Act would have
been to continue with a client-based exemption, perhaps one that
aligns with the securities laws’ private placement exemption.
That is, if, prior to the financial crisis, an exemption from
registration based on the number of clients an adviser advises
was reasonable, there is no apparent basis—whether arising
from the financial crisis or otherwise—for concluding that such
an exemption has become unreasonable. Indeed, there are good
arguments not only for continuing that exemption but for
16
17
18

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
See id. § 77d(a)(2).
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508.
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expanding it such that an adviser with considerably more than
fourteen clients may remain exempt from registration so long as
those clients meet specified wealth or sophistication tests.
To be sure, as noted, Dodd-Frank allows a limited exemption
for those advisers that manage only private funds.19 That
exemption, however, is wrong-headed because it disregards the
nature of private funds. Private funds may be thought of as an
aggregation of clients—a pooling of those who might otherwise
have engaged an adviser directly but instead invested in a fund
that the adviser manages. A simple example illustrates the
concern: Our adviser noted above who manages a small private
fund with very few investors and, separately, three individuals’
brokerage accounts cannot avail itself of the limited exemption,
whereas an adviser managing only private funds but with
thousands of investors—would-be clients—in those funds could
avail itself of the exemption. Viewed in that light, for purposes of
exemptions under the Advisers Act based on the number of
clients an adviser has, separate account clients and private fund
investors should have the same status. Each of them, in other
words, should count. In ignoring both this circumstance and the
pointlessness of requiring those advisers with only a small
number of clients and/or fund investors to become registered,
Congress and the SEC squandered an opportunity to make the
Advisers Act more coherent and regulation more efficient.
II. HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS
A second weakness of the current U.S. investment adviser
regulatory regime is—perhaps surprisingly—its failure to
adequately address the growth and continued prevalence of
private funds.20 These are pooled investment vehicles, such as
hedge funds, venture capital funds, and private equity funds, to
name a few, that are exempt from registration with the SEC
under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 194021 (the “ICA”).
That exemption distinguishes these funds from mutual funds and

19

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
To be sure, notwithstanding the growth of private funds, many investment
advisers do not manage any, focusing instead on, for example, managing “separate
accounts” on behalf of individual or institutional clients or advising clients on a nondiscretionary basis.
21
The exemption is a product of the ICA’s exclusion of those funds from the
statute’s definition of “investment company.” See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c).
20
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other publicly-held funds, which are so registered and, therefore,
must comply with the ICA’s substantive provisions.22 The
problems with investment adviser regulation, insofar as private
funds are concerned, are a product of the fact that the Advisers
Act did not expressly contemplate private funds at the time of its
enactment, and regulators’ later attempts to address them have
created piecemeal, patchwork legislation and rules that render
the Advisers Act, taken as a whole, less than effective in
addressing the regulatory concerns that private funds create.23
This author has articulated several of these problems
elsewhere.24 For example, once private funds came onto the
scene, over time lawmakers and regulators formulated a doctrine
under which the private funds that an adviser manages—rather
than the private funds’ myriad investors—are deemed to be the
adviser’s “clients” and, therefore, the subject of the Advisers Act’s
That doctrine makes little sense when one
protections.25
considers that private funds’ origins lie in their role as a
mechanism of convenience, to facilitate an adviser’s management
of the assets of smaller would-be clients.26 It also, and more
problematically, creates anomalies that militate against the
Advisers Act’s investor protection objectives.27
Specifically, the doctrine’s implications for those objectives is
a product of the sorts of protections the Advisers Act provides.
Consistent with the U.S. securities laws generally, the Advisers
Act seeks to protect advisory clients through, among other
things, requiring that advisers make certain types of disclosures
to their clients.28 Moreover, given that an adviser is a fiduciary
to its clients, the Advisers Act’s anti-fraud provisions are to be
given a broad, remedial construction, rather than a narrow,

22

See id. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (identifying the numerous provisions of the ICA).
See Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and
the Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1517 (2011) [hereinafter Krug, The
Hedge Fund Problem].
24
See id. at 28–31; Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for “Hedge Fund
Regulation”: A Reconsideration of “Client” Under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 55 VILL. L. REV. 661, 672–79 (2010) [hereinafter Krug, Moving Beyond the
Clamor].
25
See Krug, The Hedge Fund Problem, supra note 23, at 28–31.
26
See Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor, supra note 24, at 690–91.
27
See id. at 672–79.
28
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-3(b) (2013); Krug, The
Hedge Fund Problem, supra note 23, at 27 n.120.
23
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technical one.29 That, in turn, means that, for an adviser to be in
compliance with those provisions—in other words, for it to avoid
being deemed to have deceived or misled clients—the adviser’s
disclosures to its clients regarding its activities and services must
be similarly broad and encompassing.30 A second regulatory tool
of the Advisers Act is to require advisers to obtain client consent
before engaging in certain types of activities, such as those as to
which the adviser’s interests may be seen as adverse to its
clients’ interests.31
When the private fund that an adviser manages, rather than
the fund’s investors, is the “client,” then it is the fund—and not
its investors—that is formally entitled to receive the adviser’s
disclosures and to provide or not provide consent to the adviser’s
proposed conflict-of-interest transactions. That might not be
problematic if the fund’s representatives or spokespersons were
trustees of or fiduciaries as to the investors’ interests. In fact,
however, it is very often the case that the adviser itself controls
and speaks for—and consents on behalf of—the fund, whether as
a formal matter or as a de facto one.32 The fund, after all, is
typically the adviser’s creation—again, a mechanism of efficiency
in the adviser’s management of numerous investors’ assets. This
doctrine remains intact in our post-Dodd-Frank world.33
That the SEC and Congress, combined with the courts,
adopted the doctrine evinces a regulatory focus on the “thing”
whose assets the adviser actually deploys for investment in
securities and other instruments. In this case, as in many, the
thing is an entity, one whose boundaries regulation does not look
beyond to discern the substance of the relationship between a
private fund’s investors and the fund’s adviser.
It is a
manifestation of entity-centrism in securities regulation—or, in
other words, the tendency of laws and regulations to give undue
weight to discrete entities based on an apparent assumption that
each entity is an isolated whole, independent of relationships
that further define it and that are constitutive of it.

29
30
31
32
33

See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
See id. at 196–97.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5(a), -6(3) (2012).
See Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor, supra note 24, at 673.
See id.
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Indeed, we might see that tendency in a second substantive
problem with the Advisers Act’s approach to regulation of
advisers to private funds. That problem centers on the fact that
many advisory firms are not themselves stand-alone entities but,
instead, are part of a group—be it large or small—of affiliated
entities. That may be because a financial enterprise provides
various types of financial services—for example, investment
advice, broker-dealer services, and insurance. In those cases, it
is at least reasonable for each type of service provided to be
housed in a separate entity, if only for liability limitation and
risk management purposes.
However, in the investment
advisory arena, it is also not at all unusual for advisers who
manage private funds to create multiple entities devoted to the
advisers’ private-fund advisory activities. In those situations, the
investment advisory firm itself comprises multiple entities.
Most commonly in such circumstances, the entity that
formally serves as the investment adviser to the private funds—
and that is subject to regulation as such—has a merely
contractual relationship with the fund, while a second entity,
typically with the same ownership as the investment adviser
entity, is formed to be the funds’ general partner or managing
member.34 The entities’ owners may opt for this sort of “split
structure” for any of a number of reasons, but a common one is to
achieve more favorable tax treatment where, for example, the
funds’ compensation to the adviser takes the form of a profit
allocation or the adviser plans to engage marketers to recruit
fund investors.35 Although this structure is more complex than
one in which the investment adviser entity also serves as the
general partner, the tax savings to the firm or achievement of
other objectives is considered worth the complexity—at least
until one considers the regulatory complications the structure
has tended to create.
The investment adviser regulatory regime does not, in many
respects, contemplate that an investment advisory firm may
comprise multiple entities. As a result, although the investment
adviser entity is the registered and regulated entity, there
34
See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Bus. Law, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL
3334980, at *9, *28 (Dec. 8, 2005) (discussing requirements for investment advisers
to hedge funds in establishing another entity to serve as a hedge fund’s general
partner).
35
See id.
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necessarily remains the lingering question—one that has caused
considerable regulatory handwringing—of whether the general
partner entities must also become registered or whether, to the
contrary, they need not do so. The rationale for requiring
registration is that a general partner entity does things that the
investment adviser entity would otherwise do, namely receive
compensation from the fund that, but for the split structure, the
adviser entity would receive. Accordingly, so the argument goes,
the general partner entity is subject to the same conflicts of
interest as the adviser entity in connection with its operation of
the fund—in its capacity as the fund’s general partner—
notwithstanding that the general partner is not the entity that
formally manages the fund’s investments. The rationale for the
general partner entity’s not having to become registered is, of
course, exactly that: The entity does not provide investment
advice, so why should it have to be regulated as an investment
adviser, especially since that regulation would be duplicative of
the regulation of the investment adviser entity?36
Over time, the SEC developed a solution, which, in a nut
shell, was to allow the special purpose entity to forego
registration as an investment adviser, so long as it both
maintained the sorts of books and records that it would be
required to maintain if it were registered as an adviser and made
those books and records available for examination by the SEC
staff to the same extent as the registered entity.37 State
regulators, which are responsible for regulating ever-more
investment advisers as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
amendments to the Advisers Act,38 have remained considerably
more flummoxed, in some cases evincing little understanding of
the rationale for split structures and extreme skepticism about
the SEC’s compromise approach. The result has doubtless been
to cause split-structure investment advisory firms to bear
substantially greater regulation-related expenses and to confront
substantially greater regulatory obstacles than what need be the
case. That, in turn, highlights once again how investment
adviser regulation is unduly focused on entities and entityseparation, at the expense of addressing firms’ substantive

36
37
38

See id.
See id.
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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activities and the risks those activities create. Accordingly, it
also highlights another way in which investment adviser
regulation could be improved.
III. ADVISERS TO PUBLICLY-OFFERED FUNDS
As the previous Part discusses, U.S. investment adviser
regulation remains poorly suited for the regulation of investment
advisers managing private funds. That is, in part, a product of
the fact that private-fund-specific regulation is essentially tacked
on to the original regulatory structure. Unlike private funds,
publicly-held funds, such as mutual funds, were well within
Congress’s view at the time it enacted the securities statutes and,
also unlike private funds, are subject to their own separate and
complex regulatory regime, namely that established by the ICA.39
Nonetheless, investment adviser regulation is likewise
problematic in its coverage of investment advisers to public
funds.
The ICA was enacted at the same time as the Advisers Act,
its companion statute. Whereas the Advisers Act regulates
investment advisers, and, therefore, “private fund regulation” is
achieved through regulation of investment advisers to private
funds, the ICA regulates public funds themselves.40
And
extensive regulation it is. Among other things, the ICA specifies
that each public fund—an “investment company” under the
ICA—is to be managed and governed by a mostly-“independent”
board of directors,41 which oversees the investment company’s
activities, including the investment company’s relationships with
its investment adviser and its other service providers, such as its
administrator, its transfer agent, and its distributors.42
The board, moreover, oversees the investment company’s
compliance with the many substantive requirements set forth in
the ICA.43 Among those requirements are ones governing
leverage and investment portfolio composition, which are
intended to limit the riskiness of the investment company’s
investment strategy;44 transactions between the investment
39
40
41
42
43
44

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012).
See id.
See id. § 80a-10(b).
See id. §§ 80a-1 to -64.
See id.
See id. § 80a-12.
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company and certain of its affiliated persons;45 and the
procedures that must be followed before the investment company
may bear distribution expenses.46 Moreover, the investment
company must hold occasional shareholder (investor) meetings
for purposes of electing or removing members of the board and
approving the investment advisory agreement between the
investment company and its investment adviser, as well as
weighing in on any other matters that the board may determine
to put before the shareholders.47
The rationale for such extensive regulation is not difficult to
discern.
ICA-registered investment companies are public
companies,48 meaning that anyone, including so-called retail—or
“unsophisticated”—investors, is eligible to invest in them. The
policy judgment behind regulation is that such investors are in
greater need of regulatory protection, as compared with private
fund investors, who, under Rule 506 of Regulation D, must meet
certain financial sophistication thresholds.49 Certainly that
rationale would seem to present little with which to quibble and,
indeed, is consonant with the approach to an exemption from
investment adviser regulation proposed in Part I. Whether the
regulation itself is coherent and effective is a separate question.
Although there are reasons to answer that question in the
negative, the analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, focused
as it is on the regulation of investment advisers. That very
dichotomy, however, reveals the difficulty with investment
adviser regulation, insofar as it encompasses investment advisers
to investment companies. To put it succinctly—and, perhaps, a
bit too colloquially—the ICA and the Advisers Act step all over
one another and, together, arguably constitute inefficient and
redundant regulation. To see how this is so, we need to think
about what, exactly, an investment company is and, more
specifically, how it operates.
Many business enterprises are managed by persons that do
not actually own an appreciable part of the firm’s equity. That
state of affairs leads to the classic problem of corporate
governance—namely, how to keep managers accountable to
45
46
47
48
49

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17a-6 to -7 (2013).
See id. § 270.12b-1.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15.
See id. § 80a-1(a)(1).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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shareholders or other relevant stakeholders and reduce agency
costs.50 Although investment companies formally have corporate
structures, they lack the core relationships—among officers,
directors, and shareholders—present within “operating”
companies—General Electric, Facebook, Costco, or Starbucks, for
example. Rather than governance by a management group
internal to the entity, an investment company is effectively
governed by a separate firm altogether.51 In particular, the
investment company’s operations and investment activities often
are largely under the control of its investment adviser, and,
similar to a private fund, the investment company typically
exists solely by virtue of the investment adviser’s decision to
create it.52
Among other things, the investment adviser typically
employs the portfolio managers that manage the investment
company’s portfolio, selects and negotiates arrangements with
the company’s service providers, and is primarily in charge of the
investment company’s compliance with many of its regulatory
obligations.53 To be sure, investment companies are required to
have boards of directors who, as noted, are formally responsible
for the investment company’s governance and regulatory
compliance.54 In practice, however, investment company boards
have tended to defer to the wishes of the investment adviser,
particularly to the extent that board members lack expertise
regarding investment company operations and regulation.55 In
essence, investment companies may be considered less as
companies and more as true investment “vehicles,” doing really
nothing other than facilitating the investment adviser’s
aggregated management of the assets of numerous discrete
investors.

50
See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 634, 636 (2004).
51
See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010); Lyman Johnson, A
Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg
at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 503 (2008).
52
See Jones, 559 U.S. at 338; Johnson, supra note 51, at 503–04.
53
See Jones, 559 U.S. at 338; Johnson, supra note 51, at 503–04.
54
See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
55
See A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal
and Econometric Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 752–53 (2008).
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Neither the ICA nor the Advisers Act reflects that
circumstance, however. That is evidenced by the statutes’
imposition of dual, yet similar, regulatory obligations on both an
investment company and its investment adviser. For example,
the ICA contains a requirement that the investment company
and the investment adviser adopt and maintain a “code of ethics”
that is reasonably designed to ensure their respective compliance
with applicable laws and to mitigate conflicts of interest that
might exist between shareholders, on one hand, and the
investment company or its investment adviser or any of their
respective “access persons,” on the other.56 For these purposes,
the investment adviser’s directors and officers may be deemed to
be access persons of the investment company.57 Accordingly, at
least some of the investment adviser’s personnel may be subject
to restrictions set forth in the investment company’s code of
ethics, including those governing trading and investing in the
same securities or types of securities as those in which the
investment company invests.
Certainly the regulatory objectives behind the code-of-ethics
requirement are sound. As the ICA itself suggests, conflicts of
interest in connection with proprietary trades were among the
primary problems afflicting the investment company industry at
the time the ICA was enacted.58 Incoherence derives from the
fact that, under Advisers Act—as a result of relatively recent
changes to the rules under that Act—the investment adviser is
also directly subject to a code-of-ethics requirement.59 Yet
neither Congress nor the SEC has clearly specified how these
separate code-of-ethics requirements relate to one another, why
investment advisers to investment companies must comply with
duplicative regulatory provisions, or what is the rationale behind
requiring certain investment advisory personnel to comply with
two separate codes of ethics. A similar question arises as to the
ICA’s requirement that an investment company have a “chief
compliance officer,”60 given that the rules under the Advisers Act
require the same of investment advisers.61 Moreover, investment

56
57
58
59
60
61

See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c) (2013).
See id. § 270.17j-1(a)(1)(i).
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012).
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1.
See id. § 270.38a-1(a)(4).
See id. § 275.206(4)-7(c).
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companies are required to adopt policies and procedures
reasonably designed to prevent, detect, and address possible
risks associated with most aspects of their operations,62 a
requirement that is similar to one applicable to investment
advisers under the Advisers Act.63
This duplication, of course, presumably does not redound to
the detriment of investors, nor does it likely have any discernible
impact on the market for investment advisers or, for that matter,
on the investment company industry. However, the duplication
highlights the uneasy fit between the ICA and the Advisers Act,
statutes that may be “companions” and that may regulate
intertwined fields of activity but that, in many ways, seem
distinct and independent from one another. Part of the problem
is that investment company regulation may not adequately
reflect that an investment adviser is an essential part of what an
investment company does. Perhaps, to address the matter,
investment adviser regulation should encompass investment
company regulation or vice versa. What is clear is that the
apparent lack of coordination between the two statutes at least
raises the prospect that consolidating the regulatory regimes
could lead to greater regulatory efficiency, not to mention greater
regulatory coherence.
IV. SPECIFIC RULES VERSUS BROAD STANDARDS
At the risk of painting with too large a brush, one might say
that the U.S. securities laws are generally standards-based,
rather than rules-based. They are premised, in the name of
efficiency, on the goal of informing securities markets
participants and, toward that end, require that those who aim to
sell securities to, or buy securities from, less-informed
counterparties disclose all material information so that, in the
transaction, those counterparties will not be unfairly
disadvantaged.64 In other words, eschewing specific rules and
procedures for securities markets transactions, the U.S.

62

See id. § 270.38a-1.
See id. § 275.206(4)-7.
64
See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 330 (1988).
63
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securities regulatory regime pursues its objectives primarily
through broad disclosure standards, leaving it to the regulatory
subjects to determine how best to meet those standards.
The ICA’s approach to investment company regulation
arguably constitutes an exception to that basic regulatory
approach. As suggested in the previous section, the ICA contains
specific requirements,65 which cover matters ranging from the
composition of an investment company’s board of directors66 to
the amount of leverage the investment company may use in its
investment activities.67 The list could continue, but the point
should be apparent: The ICA, in many respects, does not rely
only on generally-phrased disclosure requirements, and, to the
extent it mandates disclosure, it does not, for the most part, leave
it entirely up to investment companies and their boards to
determine what that disclosure should be.68 Accordingly, the ICA
might be said to embrace a rules-based approach, at least in
comparison to U.S. securities laws and regulations generally.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, so might the Advisers Act, albeit
to a lesser extent.
Whether the securities laws’ standards-based disclosure
regime is able to achieve its objectives is, at best, open for debate.
Certainly there are reasons to be skeptical.
Nonetheless,
whatever may be the costs or benefits of deploying standards in
most securities regulatory contexts, the rules that pervade
investment adviser regulation are, for the most part,
counterproductive. One difficulty with the sorts of substantive
requirements that are reflected in the Advisers Act and the
SEC’s rules under that statute is that those requirements and
rules are so readily overtaken by changes in the subject matter to
which they apply. Put another way, the rules’ specific, granular
requirements are susceptible to becoming incoherent in their
application and/or obsolete and, therefore, irrelevant—if not
actually harmful—on a net basis. A second difficulty is, perhaps,
more singular: Many of the Advisers Act’s substantive rules
seem not to serve any worthy regulatory purpose. Two examples
are illustrative.

65
66
67
68

See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, -30 (2012).
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Beginning with the Advisers Act itself, as opposed to the
SEC’s rules, section 205 of that statute requires that certain
types of provisions be included in investment advisory
agreements entered into by SEC-regulated investment advisers.69
To begin with, if the adviser is organized as a partnership, the
agreement must contain a provision obligating the adviser to
inform the client of any change in the adviser’s “membership.”70
The SEC, in a “no-action letter,” has taken the position that, if
the partnership in question is a limited partnership, then the
advisory agreement need only contain a provision to the effect
that the adviser will notify the client of a change in the adviser’s
general partner.71
Apart from presenting the curiosity of
requiring certain client notifications through regulating the
contents of advisory agreements rather than through directly
imposing the obligation, there are a number of difficulties with
this provision.
First, one can imagine that a change of a partnership’s
membership, particularly one involving the general partner of a
limited partnership, would be tantamount to an assignment of
the agreement, in which case the adviser’s fiduciary duties
should serve to protect the client. Second, there are myriad
circumstances in which a change of a partnership’s
membership—even one that involves a general partner—might
cause no change in the substantive control of the partnership, in
which case the notification requirement serves no purpose and is
merely one more regulatory item on an adviser’s compliance
checklist. Third, the requirement, even if it serves a plausible
regulatory function, is under-inclusive in its failure to encompass
newer types of business associations, such as limited liability
companies, and over-inclusive in its failure to acknowledge that,
even in general partnerships, not every partner is an active
participant in the business or significant owner whose departure
should trigger the requirement. Yet, year after year, lawyers, in
drafting or reviewing the investment advisory agreements of
their clients who are investment advisers organized as

69

See id. § 80b-5.
See id. § 80b-5(a)(3).
71
See The Ayco Co., L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 861516, at *1–3 (Dec.
14, 1995).
70

FINAL_KRUG

468

2/27/2014 6:24 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:451

partnerships, are careful to ensure the provision’s presence, as do
the SEC examiners in their periodic reviews of those advisers’
businesses.
Also under section 205, an investment advisory agreement
must provide, in substance, that the adviser will not assign the
agreement without the client’s consent,72 a requirement that
seems similarly inefficient. Specifically, as most any competent
lawyer is aware, agreements often expressly contemplate the
possibility that one party may, in the future, wish to assign its
contractual rights and obligations and, accordingly, specify
whether the counterparty’s consent is required for such an
assignment. Assignment provisions, in other words, are routine,
almost rote, components of agreements. They are, moreover,
provisions of which parties to an investment advisory agreement
presumably are aware, and those parties should have ample
incentives, apart from those imposed by the Advisers Act, to
include an assignment provision in their contractual
arrangement. More importantly, to the extent the adviser and
the client have not meaningfully negotiated assignment terms,
then regardless of the agreement’s specific language, the adviser
presumably would be deemed to be in breach of its fiduciary
duties to the client by assigning the agreement without having
obtained the client’s consent or otherwise in a manner that may
be deemed detrimental to the client.73
Turning to the SEC’s rules under the Advisers Act, there is
the advertising rule—rule 206(4)-1.74 That rule sets forth specific
requirements for investment advisers’ “advertisements”—
72

See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2).
Finally, section 205 specifies that no investment contract may provide for
performance-based compensation—compensation based on the profit the adviser
earns for the client—unless the compensation arrangements meet certain
requirements, including whatever requirements the SEC may specify through its
rulemaking. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1), (e). Pursuant to that authorization, the
SEC, in rule 205-3, requires that the adviser ensure that any client from whom it is
to receive performance-based compensation meet the “qualified client” test, meaning
that he or she must have a net worth of at least two million dollars or have placed at
least one million dollars under the adviser’s management. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3
(2013). The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to revise these financial thresholds,
based on inflation, every few years. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 418, 124 Stat. 1376, 1579 (2010)
(providing that, by July 21, 2011 and every five years thereafter, the SEC must
adjust for inflation the dollar amount thresholds in rules issued under Advisers Act
§ 205(e)).
74
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–1.
73
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basically any communication regarding an adviser’s services or
performance sent to more than one person—including, for
example, that advertisements may not contain testimonials, that
they may not state that an advisory service will be provided free
of charge unless it actually is provided free of charge, and that
they may not “represent[], directly or indirectly, that any graph,
chart, formula or other device being offered can in and of itself be
used to determine which securities to buy or sell, or when to buy
or sell them.”75 The rule also specifies that no advertisement
may contain any “past specific recommendations” that “were or
would have been profitable to any person,” unless, essentially,
the advertisement or a separately-provided list sets forth all of
the “recommendations” made by the adviser in the past year.76
It is difficult to know where to begin with this rule, as it
raises a number of questions that the SEC staff have not
definitively answered.77 The spirit behind the rule is clear:
Advisers should not “cherry pick”—that is, they should not
mention only profitable trades in their advertisements without
also mentioning trades that were unprofitable. However, one
substantial challenge for advisers and their counsel has been to
understand what is a “past” recommendation, as opposed to a
current recommendation or a future recommendation. If an
adviser bought IBM stock three months ago, and that stock has
appreciated in value, but the adviser has not yet sold it, is IBM a
past or a present recommendation? If the adviser bought Google
stock on behalf of it clients and expects that the investment will
be profitable, is that a past, a present, or a future
recommendation? Moreover, and turning to a second thorny
component of the rule, was or would that recommendation have
been profitable to any person? What if the IBM investment
described above was profitable in the first month but then

75

Id.
Id.
77
The first hurdle is to understand what “recommendation” as used in this rule
might mean. One might be inclined to think “recommending” is what happens when
an investment adviser suggests that a client make a particular investment or
endorses a particular securities transaction. One would be correct in so thinking,
but, in this context—and, perversely a few other, but not all, contexts under the
Advisers Act—it also encompasses an adviser’s discretionary securities transactions
on behalf of a client, even where the client has no inkling that the transaction is
occurring.
76
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decreased in value to a point below the original purchase price?
Can we say the investment was or would have been profitable to
any person?
These questions are more than academic, as their answers
determine whether an adviser is in violation of the SEC’s rules.
Unfortunately, the SEC staff have been slow and incomplete in
their elaboration of the meaning of the rule, and any elaboration
that occurs outside of the SEC’s sporadic interpretive releases
tends to be conservative and restrictive. The fact remains,
however, that a core component of an adviser’s interactions with
its clients is its periodic descriptions of what, exactly, the adviser
has done with its clients’ assets, what investment opportunities
seem ripe for the taking, and what the adviser plans to do going
forward. The SEC’s too-specific, too-detailed advertising rule,
arguably veering from the anti-cherry-picking policy behind it,
has often prevented advisers from providing those sorts of
disclosures. A prospect worth considering is whether the simple
anti-fraud catch-all provision that is also part of the advertising
rule could further the rule’s policy objectives without hindering
investment advisers’ performance of their services in their
clients’ best interests.
V.

EXAMINATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Regulations and statutory provisions are only two of the
critical components of any regulatory system. Enforcement of
those regulations and provisions is another fundamental
component. As described below, when it comes to U.S. regulation
of investment advisers, a number of factors serve to undermine
effective enforcement. Of course, that enforcement measures
may be wanting does not necessarily have any implications for
the nature and content of the regulation itself. However, there
are ways in which better formulated regulation might better
serve the goals of punishment, deterrence, and detecting
wrongdoing, thereby promoting market integrity and protecting
investors.
As is the case for U.S. securities regulation generally, the
primary federal enforcement authority for U.S. investment
adviser regulation is the SEC.78 The SEC performs this function
78
State regulators may also play a role in enforcement. In particular, pursuant
to section 203A(b)(2) of the Advisers Act, state regulatory authorities may bring
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in a variety of ways. Investors or others may submit a complaint
to the SEC staff regarding a particular investment adviser, and,
should the SEC investigate the subject of the complaint, that
investigation may ultimately lead to an enforcement action.79
Alternatively, the SEC may review or monitor securities
transactions by market participants, including investment
advisers, to detect wrongdoing.80 For example, it may observe
suspiciously-timed trades that indicate that an investment
adviser or one of its employees has traded on inside
information.81 If further investigation produces support for that
possibility, the SEC may pursue an enforcement action.82
Finally, the SEC staff, in the course of their periodic examination
of an investment adviser’s books and records, may find that the
adviser or its personnel has materially violated requirements
under the Advisers Act or the SEC’s regulations thereunder and
launch an enforcement action on that basis.83 Of course, it is also
possible for an investment adviser simply to admit to having
violated applicable laws and regulations, as was the case with
Bernie Madoff.
Enforcement in the investment advisory context has multiple
roles. That is, the SEC may bring enforcement actions against
an investment adviser for such transgressions as failing to
maintain its books and records in the manner required by the
recordkeeping rule,84 charging performance fees to clients that do
not meet the SEC’s prescribed financial sophistication test,85 and
neglecting to follow procedures the SEC has mandated in
connection with paying cash compensation to marketers engaged
to solicit new clients.86 The SEC may also look to punish an
investment adviser for arguably more severe activities, such as
inappropriately using “soft dollars,” which are payments by
fraud actions against SEC-registered investment advisers. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b3a(b)(2).
79
See id. § 80b-9.
80
See id. § 80b-4.
81
See id.
82
See id. § 80b-9.
83
See John H. Walsh, Regulatory Supervision by the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Examinations in a Disclosure-Enforcement Agency, 51 ADMIN L. REV.
1229, 1231–32, 1239–40 (1999).
84
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2013).
85
See id. § 275.205-3(a), (d)(1); supra note 70 (describing this sophistication
test).
86
See id. § 275.206(4)-3(a)–(b).
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securities brokerage firms in recognition of brokerage
commissions earned from transactions effected by the adviser on
behalf of its clients;87 failing to provide disclosure to clients
regarding particular conflicts of interest; or engaging in “style
drift”—that is, straying from the investment strategy set forth in
the disclosure provided to clients.88 Finally, the SEC may pursue
the most harmful conduct—namely, more blatantly fraudulent
activity, in which, for example, an adviser systematically
overcharges clients for services rendered or misappropriates
client assets for its own uses.89
Intuitively, the most important role of enforcement is finding
and punishing fraudulent activity that directly harms clients
through depleting their assets in a manner that has nothing to
do with the adviser’s investment advisory function.90 Most
famously, and apart from Charles Ponzi himself, that is Madoff.
That is also Arthur Nadel,91 Samuel Israel III,92 Nicholas
Cosmo,93 Darren Berg,94 and many, many others. The conduct of
investment advisers who defraud their clients and investors of
funds placed in their trust produces harm that is substantially
greater than the harm arising from an adviser’s sloppy
bookkeeping or failure to implement a privacy policy. Quite

87

See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e).
These activities typically constitute breaches of the fiduciary duty an adviser
owes to clients, as described by the Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92, 196–97
(1963).
89
The Advisers Act contains anti-fraud provisions, see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, as do
the SEC’s rules under the Advisers Act, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(3)-1–.206(4)-8.
90
Generally, that type of fraudulent conduct is a greater possibility where the
adviser or one of its affiliates has “custody” of client assets. See
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a), (d)(2).
91
See Patricia Hurtado & Bob Van Voris, Ex-Florida Money Manager Nadel
Sentenced to 168 Months in Prison for Fraud, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/ex-florida-money-manager-nadelsentenced-to-168-months-in-prison-for-fraud.html.
92
Reuters, Hedge Fund Founder Given 20 Years for Investor Fraud, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/business/15bayou.html?_r=2&
ref=samuelisraeliii&.
93
See Thom Weidlich, Nicholas Cosmo Receives 25 Years in Prison for $413
Million Ponzi Scheme, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-10-14/cosmo-gets-25-year-sentence-for-scheme.html.
94
See Rami Grunbaum, Darren Berg Gets 18-Year Sentence for Ponzi Scheme,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 6:35 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/business
technology/2017465361_meridian10.html.
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obviously, such conduct can, and often does, dramatically and
permanently adversely impact the clients’ livelihoods and,
indeed, their lives.
Yet that sort of fraudulent activity is precisely the conduct
that, so it appears, the SEC is least equipped to detect and
punish. Part of the reason may be that fraud of the worst sorts is
nothing if not intentional and, therefore, difficult—very
difficult—to detect.95 Because of that, one might surmise that the
SEC would expend extra effort in the service of fraud detection
efforts. Perversely, however, although the SEC is very diligent,
and largely effective, in detecting whether an adviser has
complied with the more technical rules under the Advisers Act,
anecdotal observations suggest that, by and large, it has not
devoted significant attention to detecting intentionally
fraudulent activity. This conclusion arises from the manner in
which SEC staff have often used their opportunities to examine
what, exactly, an investment adviser—that is, one that is SECregistered—is doing vis-à-vis its clients and the assets they have
placed under the adviser’s management.
An SEC-registered investment adviser is subject to the SEC
staff’s periodic—every three or four years or so—examination of
the adviser’s books and records.96
These examinations
encompass not only the staff’s reviewing the adviser’s records but
also their interviewing firm personnel.97 The problem is that the
focus of these examinations, which, in some cases, have been
conducted by relatively inexperienced personnel, often center on
the more technical, compliance-related aspects of the Advisers
Act and its rules. The product of an examination, moreover, is
usually a deficiency letter that one might characterize as a “fix-it
ticket,” requiring the adviser to correct its regulatory deficiencies
and declare to the SEC that it has done so.98 Until recently, at
least, the staff have made insufficient effort to verify client assets
and securities held on their behalf. Once again, Madoff is exhibit
one in this regard.
95
See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Combating Securities
Fraud at Home and Abroad (May 28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/
spch052809laa.htm.
96
See Walsh, supra note 83, at 1231.
97
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXAMINATIONS BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS 24 (2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocieoverview.pdf.
98
See Walsh, supra note 83, at 1238, 1240.
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Whatever the Advisers Act’s provisions might say and
whatever rules the SEC may adopt, investment adviser
regulation will not achieve its goals without effective
enforcement capabilities and, in particular, the ability to detect
advisers’ intentionally fraudulent conduct. Nonetheless, it is
worth considering whether the nature of the current regulations
and, in particular, their favoring technical requirements over
broad disclosure standards, might be a distraction in the SEC’s
enforcement efforts. If SEC staff, in their examinations, are
primarily concerned with whether an adviser dotted its “i’s” and
crossed its “t’s” and otherwise complied with the detailed rules to
which it is subject—and, arguably, so long as the rules exist, that
is, indeed, a legitimate concern—then perhaps we should be
neither surprised nor chagrined that detecting truly harmful
behavior has apparently been given short shrift.
CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A BETTER APPROACH
If the U.S. investment adviser regulatory regime is flawed,
as this Article suggests, then it is a further question of what
might be a better approach. One implication of the concerns this
Article has identified is that the U.S. laws and regulations
governing investment advisers—and the public and private funds
they manage—should be reconceptualized and reformulated from
the ground up. After all, those concerns encompass far-ranging
problems, including ones associated with the Advisers Act’s
structure and regulatory scope, regulatory and judicial doctrine
based on the statute, and oversight and enforcement under it.
Commensurately comprehensive reform, then, is likely in order,
and one approach to pursuing it might be to look to other, nonU.S. jurisdictions whose investment adviser regulatory regimes
are relatively more modern than their U.S. counterpart.
Success in such reform efforts may not seem particularly
unreasonable, considering both the vintage of the U.S. securities
laws and regulations and the evolution of the investment adviser
industry since their inception. However—and as might be
obvious—prospects for reform must be considered in the context
of political realities, which counsel that even incremental
regulatory changes are likely targets of fierce resistance,
depending on whose interests those changes are deemed to
adversely affect. As noted in the Introduction, the Dodd-Frank
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Act included a number of amendments to the Advisers Act.99 At
least some participants in the reform process that culminated in
Dodd-Frank presumably acknowledged the possible need for
thoroughgoing changes to the statute. Yet, as noted, the reforms
that ultimately came to be were far from comprehensive.100
It is worth mentioning one component of some recent reform
proposals—namely, the creation of a self-regulatory organization
(“SRO”) for investment advisers, along the lines of the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority, which regulates broker-dealers,
and the National Futures Association and “designated” SROs,
such as the Commodity Mercantile Exchange, which govern
regulated participants in the commodity futures industry.101 It
may be that an SRO would be a useful complement to investment
adviser regulation. Among other things, such a regulator,
privately funded and with its own personnel and oversight
resources, could improve overall regulatory monitoring and
enforcement. Nonetheless, to be effective in that regard, the SRO
arguably would need to have developed and implemented
investigation and fraud-detection procedures that surpass those
that the SEC has heretofore demonstrated.102 It is by no means a
certainty that the organization could or would do so. The
National Futures Association’s and the CME Group’s recent, and
dismal, regulatory failures provide ample reason for
skepticism.103
More to the point, in light of the arguments presented in this
Article, it is difficult to conceive of an SRO improving the
regulatory
situation
without
policymakers
first—or
simultaneously—achieving the comprehensive legal and
regulatory changes contemplated above. Indeed, without that
reform, the presence of an SRO presumably could make matters
99

See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
101
More recently, in April 2012, Representative Spencer Bachus (R-AL)
introduced a bill in the House of Representatives that would establish an SRO for
investment advisers. See Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624,
112th Cong. § 203B(a) (2012).
102
See supra Part V.
103
See Azam Ahmed & Ben Protess, Clients Question CME Oversight of MF
Global, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 9, 2011, 10:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2011/11/09/clients-question-oversight-by-mf-globals-regulator/; Silla Brush &
Matthew Leising, Peregrine Has U.S. Futures Regulators on Defense in Congress,
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0725/peregrine-has-u-s-futures-regulators-on-defense-at-house-panel.html.
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worse, by imposing an additional regulatory layer onto one that
is already too complex and too incoherent. Put another way,
creating a new regulatory authority could be yet another
piecemeal regulatory fix that could further obscure, if not
exacerbate, more extensive and entrenched regulatory
shortcomings. Better investment adviser regulation—that is,
more effective and efficient investor protection and promotion of
market integrity—requires, in some sense, returning to square
one and thinking critically about what that regulation should be
and what it should accomplish.

